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Introduction
The appointment of a new central bank governor 1 is usually accompanied by public uncertainty about her/his preferences regarding the inflation-output tradeoff. As a consequence, agents have to update their inflation expectations based on incomplete information about the governor's characteristics. One popular hypothesis is that newly appointed central bankers are perceived as "dovish" (i.e., willing to tolerate higher inflation rates) until they have established a credible "hawkish" (i.e., inflation-averse) reputation (Kuttner and Posen, 2010) . If this "weak until proven strong" hypothesis is true, new governors will need to demonstrate their willingness to fight inflation immediately after taking office. In the context of a Taylor (1993) rule, this could imply a stronger reaction to inflation during the first quarters after inauguration. 2 In this we paper, we explore the interest rate setting behavior of newly appointed governors. We use the Kuttner and Posen (2010) sample, which covers 15 OECD countries and 50 changes in the central bank head's office. We estimate Taylor rules (TR) using the dynamic panel GMM estimator for these 15 countries and the period . In addition to standard parameters for interest rate inertia, inflation, and the output gap, we include interaction terms covering a period of four to eight quarters after a new governor takes office.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically assess whether a central bank governor's reaction to inflation varies throughout her/his incumbency. 3 We ask and answer two research questions.
Do newly appointed governors fight inflation more aggressively during the first quarters of their tenure?
Reaction to inflation during the inauguration phase could vary across institutional environment. In the case of a well-defined nominal anchor and a high degree of central bank independence (i.e., a strong monetary policy framework), agents might view the 1 We use the term "governor" to refer to the central bank's head, even though the actual job title is "president" or "chairman." 2 Currently, it is typically committees that decide on appropriate interest rates. However, empirically, the governor is found to have a huge influence on them. For instance, Blinder (2007) concludes that Alan Greenspan was influential enough to almost always impose his view on the Federal Open Market Committee. Although it is doubtful that the governor has complete discretion in setting the interest rate all the time, she/he is almost never outvoted in monetary policy decisions (Claussen et al., 2012) . This implies that the governor should have at least some agenda setting power when it comes to a vote in the monetary policy committee. 3 Hansen and McMahon (2011) The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some theoretical considerations underlying the "weak until proven strong" hypothesis and its implications for new governors' "fight" against inflation. Section 3 introduces the data set and the empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical considerations
In this section, we discuss the theory behind why we expect newly appointed central bank governors to signal more inflation-averse behavior. A useful starting point is the standard quadratic loss function that the central banker attempts to minimize (Barro and Gordon, 1983) :
where is the deviation of inflation from its target value and is the corresponding deviation of output from potential output. Future losses are discounted by the factor .
is the weight attached to output losses relative to inflation stabilization. The central banker is unable to commit to the fully optimal policy plan (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) .
Establishing a hawkish reputation Drifill, 1985a, 1985b; Vickers, 1986 ) is one solution to this commitment problem. For instance, a "conservative" central banker (Rogoff, 1985) has a small value for and is more willing to tolerate output fluctuations than inflation fluctuations. However, a priori, agents are uncertain about the new governor's preferences (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986) . 4 They have to form beliefs about the true parameter . A further complication for new governors is that the public does not observe directly; rather, they observe a noisy indicator ( due to the time lag in the implementation of monetary policy and potential control errors:
4 A credibility problem could also arise because a newly appointed governor cannot commit to the predecessor's policy plan (Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007 
where expected inflation is a function of past inflation expectations and observed preferences. The specification follows Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000) , who model inflation expectations as a function of credibility, which in turn is determined by the past inflation record and/or expectations as to whether the central bank will meet its target in the near future (i.e., how it is perceived by the public). Thus, a hawkish reputation helps anchor inflation expectations, whereas a dovish reputation leads to an increase in inflation expectations.
Under the "weak until proven strong" hypothesis, the public initially assigns central bankers a particularly high value of , that is, they consider new governors to be dovish. As a consequence, to avoid an increase in inflation expectations, newly appointed governors have to convince agents of their willingness to fight inflation immediately after taking office. Therefore, new governors have to initially signal a low value of . Moreover, as the perception is noisy (along the lines of Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986) , governors, to ensure that the public will perceive them as being hawkish, need to signal an extra low value of .
After having established a reputation for being inflation averse and thus warding off an increase in inflation expectations, the central banker can choose the actual preferred level of , which should be lower than . Choice of a lower value of goes some distance toward explaining why the degree of inflation aversion implicit in TR estimates is lower when considering the full tenure rather than focusing on the period after inauguration.
The choice of a low level of is optimal not only for actual hawks, but also for doves, as shown by Barro (1986) . If agents observe low inflation, it raises their expectations that the policymaker is committed to low inflation (hawk), even though, in truth, the policymaker may be a dove. Barro (1986) shows that the dove follows this incentive to masquerade and mimics being a hawk for a while, but eventually moves toward high inflation. Consequently, we expect an increased reaction to inflation during the first periods after inauguration, regardless of whether the new governor is a hawk or a dove.
Hansen and McMahon (2011) Their analysis focuses on the financial market reaction to the announcement of governor appointments, whereas we are interested in governor behavior after the inauguration.
The latter dates are taken either from the extensive data set by Dreher et al. (2008 Dreher et al. ( , 2010 or central bank websites. Table A1 in the Appendix lists all inauguration dates.
We assume a governor to have an effect on the end-of-quarter interest rate if she/he is in office for more than a month during the respective quarter. 6 As it is a priori unclear how long newly appointed governors behave differently in their effort to establish credibility, we employ five different horizons in the empirical analysis, ranging from four to eight quarters after inauguration (Hansen and McMahon, 2011) .
Finally, we distinguish between strong and weak monetary policy (MP) frameworks in our analysis. Again, we build on the data set by Kuttner and Posen (2010) and characterize monetary policy regimes as strong if they satisfy two criteria. First, the central bank must be at least partially independent, which means that the central bank is under no obligation to finance government spending and the governor cannot be dismissed without cause (Kuttner and Posen, 2001 ). Second, the central bank must follow either an explicit inflation target or an operational intermediate money target.
Empirical methodology
Our empirical specification follows the monetary policy reaction function proposed by Taylor (1993) with an interest rate smoothing term (Goodfriend, 1991) :
where the central bank rate in country at time , is explained by the lagged central bank rate , , which is included to measure the degree of inertia in monetary policy.
The other explanatory variables are the current inflation rate , , measured as growth rate in the consumer price index to the previous year's period, and the output gap ( , ), derived from trend industrial production using a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with 1600. Finally, represents a country fixed effect and , the error term. 7 To test for potential differences in the interest rate setting of newly appointed governors versus the sample average (first research question), we augment Equation (4) as follows: 6 For instance, if the inauguration date is May-81, the governor can influence the central bank rate in Q2-1981. In contrast, central bankers who take office in Jun-81 will first affect the central bank rate in Q3-1981. We explored the robustness of this assumption with three additional settings: the governor had to be in office in the respective quarter for at least (i) one day, (ii) two months, or (iii) a full quarter. However, the differences across indicators are small as we focus on a period of four to eight quarters after inauguration. This implies that the indicators partly overlap and reduce differences across the indicators. All omitted results are available on request. 7 Data sources: central bank rates (IMF), consumer price indexes (OECD), and industrial production (OECD). Note that the data used in this analysis are ex post data due to the lack of real-time data for all 15 countries and the complete sample period. A test for differences across strong and weak MP frameworks (second research question) is based on a small modification of Equation (5): Equations (4)- (6) are estimated using the dynamic panel GMM estimator. 9 GMM weights are based on the assumption of contemporaneous correlation between the cross-sections, which is convenient as central bank rates, inflation, and the output gap 8 One could also test for differences in the reaction to the output gap in Equations (5) and (6). However, as the regression estimates indicate no change in all cases, we focus on differences in the reaction to inflation. 9 Note that the panel is unbalanced as monetary policy in Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain has been conducted by the European Central Bank since Q1-1999. Furthermore, there are some missing observations for industrial production at the beginning of the sample in case of Australia and New Zealand.
show a substantial degree of correlation across the sample countries. As instruments for the lagged dependent variable, we employ its second to fifth lag. 10 To ensure the robustness of our findings and address Kiviet's (1995) criticism of dynamic panel GMM estimators, we additionally estimate Equations (4)-(6) using panel generalized least squares and weights based on the assumption of contemporaneous correlation between the cross-sections. 11 The results for the baseline specification indicate that interest rate setting is highly persistent (0.92). Furthermore, the central banks follow a Taylor rule as an increase in either inflation or the output gap is accompanied by a rise in the central bank rate. The coefficient for output (0.7) is in line with expectations as, for instance, Taylor 10 Note that standard econometric software is not able to invert the matrix of instruments when using all valid lags to define moment conditions (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Furthermore, simulation studies show that there is a tradeoff when increasing the number of lags: although efficiency increases, so does the finite sample bias of the GMM estimates (Judson and Owen, 1997) . 11 To ensure comparability to the GMM estimates, we use the same sample starting date (Q2-1975) although we do not need to specify lags of the endogenous variable as instruments.
Empirical results

Results for newly appointed governors
(1993) recommends a coefficient of 0.5. However, the coefficient for inflation is smaller than 1, which implies that the Taylor principle, that is, raising the central bank rate by more than the actual increase in inflation, is not met.
Turning to the augmented specifications, we can reject the null hypothesis : 0 in favor of the alternative : 0 for all five horizons. 12 Thus, we find evidence of more hawkish behavior during the first four to eight quarters of a new governor's tenure. Governors try to establish a reputation for being inflation averse during that period by initially putting a larger weight on inflation in their reaction function.
The additional reaction to inflation ranges from 0.42 to 0.56, which means that the Taylor principle is met for newly appointed governors as their total reaction, that is, the coefficient for all governors plus the additional reaction, ranges from 1.16 to 1.32.
Furthermore, the degree of interest rate smoothing is significantly lower for newly appointed governors than for the reference group (exception 4 QTRS). This implies a more proactive monetary policy during the first five to eight quarters of tenure and is further support for the idea that such activity is engaged in for reputation-building purposes. Finally, the reaction to output fluctuations does not change during the first quarters of a governor's tenure. (4) (baseline) and (6), that is, for newly appointed governors in strong MP frameworks and weak MP frameworks.
12 Note that formal testing is not required as Table 1 shows that the even more conservative two-sided null hypothesis : 0 is rejected in all cases. 13 The overall coefficient for interest rate smoothing is marginally larger than in case of the GMM estimations, whereas the coefficients for inflation and the output gap are slightly lower. The degree of interest rate smoothing does not change for newly appointed governors. Finally, the additional reaction to inflation four to eight quarters after inauguration is significant but, again, marginally lower than in the GMM case. Notes: Estimates are for Equation (4) (baseline) and Equation (6) (4 QTRS, … , 8 QTRS). Number of observations: 1,772. GMM with a White (1980) cross-section instrument weighting matrix is used as the estimation technique. Lags 2-5 of the dependent variable are employed as instruments. The models include country fixed effects (not shown). Reported coefficients are estimates for the long-run coefficients for all governors, the corresponding long-run changes for newly appointed governors in a strong MP framework and in a weak MP framework. Panel-robust standard errors are reported. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively.
Newly appointed governors in strong MP frameworks show a rigorous and highly significant additional reaction to inflation, ranging from 0.88 to 1.21. Together with the baseline reaction to inflation, the Taylor principle is met for this group as the joint reaction ranges from 1.66 to 1.94. Their counterparts in a weak MP framework show a significant additional reaction to inflation for three horizons only (6 QTRS, 7 QTRS, and 8 QTRS). In these three cases, the Taylor principle is met, too, as the joint reaction to inflation ranges from 1.21 to 1.29. Both groups display a significantly lower degree of interest rate smoothing than the reference group (exceptions: 8 QTRS for strong MP frameworks and 4 QTRS for weak MP frameworks). Finally, there is no additional significant reaction to output fluctuations for either group of new governors.
In general, the magnitude of the additional reaction to inflation differs noticeably between the groups. We cannot reject null hypothesis : for all five horizons. 14 In contrast, the reversed null hypothesis : is rejected, revealing that governors in strong MP frameworks react significantly more strongly to 14 Note that formal testing is not required as Table 2 indicates that point estimates for are larger than for .
inflation during the first four to eight quarters of their tenure than do their counterparts in weak MP frameworks. 15 This result seems counterintuitive at first: the need to establish credibility should be less strong if the central bank is at least partly independent and has a nominal anchor that limits the scope for dovish monetary policy compared to the case of a weak MP framework. However, the central bank independence literature suggests an explanation. Hayo and Hefeker (2002) model the choice for a certain degree of central bank independence as a two-step procedure. In a first step, society decides as to the importance it attaches to fighting inflation, that is, its preferences regarding the inflation-output tradeoff. In a second step, the society chooses the best institutional arrangement for achieving the objective of price stability. As a consequence, societies that put a large weight on fighting inflation will choose more independent central banks with an explicit nominal anchor. Nevertheless, even though the strong MP framework might ensure a certain initial level of credibility for a new governor, given the society's preference for hawkish monetary policy, the new governor may still display a stronger reaction to inflation. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we explore the interest rate setting behavior of newly appointed central bank governors. We use the Kuttner and Posen (2010) 15 The Chi 2 (1)-test statistics are as follows: 1.85* (4 QRTS), 3.51** (5 QRTS), 2.65* (6 QRTS), 6.74*** (7 QRTS), and 4.36** (8 QRTS). 16 In contrast to the GMM estimators, the degree of interest rate smoothing does not change for newly appointed governors in either strong or weak MP frameworks. Furthermore, the additional reaction to inflation in weak MP frameworks is marginally significant for only one specification (6 QTRS), whereas the corresponding additional reaction in strong MP frameworks is highly significant in all five cases.
First, newly appointed governors fight inflation more aggressively during the first four to eight quarters of their tenure. They try to establish a reputation for being inflation averse during this period by initially putting a larger weight on inflation.
Furthermore, their interest rate setting is more proactive during this initial period.
Second, we find a significantly stronger reaction to inflation by newly appointed governors in strong MP frameworks than in weak MP frameworks. At first glance, one would expect less of a need to establish credibility if the central bank is at least partly independent and has a nominal anchor. However, research by Hayo and Hefeker (2002) suggests that societies that have a preference for fighting inflation vigorously also choose more independent central banks with an explicit nominal anchor. In such a society, however, the reaction to inflation might still be considerably stronger, given the society's preferences.
Note that our results provide no direct test of the "weak until proven strong"
hypothesis. We only measure governors' reaction to inflation after inauguration, which is larger than for the sample average regardless of the actual monetary policy framework. However, one rationale for this behavior is that governors anticipate public pessimism and, in an effort to avoid being perceived as weak, immediately work to establish a hawkish reputation. Notes: Estimates are for Equation (4) (baseline) and Equation (6) (4 QTRS, … , 8 QTRS). Number of observations: 1,772. Panel generalized least squares with a White (1980) cross-section weighting matrix is used as the estimation technique. The models include country fixed effects (not shown). Reported coefficients are estimates for the long-run coefficients for all governors, the corresponding long-run changes for newly appointed governors in a strong MP framework and in a weak MP framework. Panelrobust standard errors are reported. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively.
